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CROOKER V BUREA U OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO
& FIREARMS: A RESULT-ORIENTED
APPROACH TO FOIA
EXEMPTION 2
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),' a product of ten years of
congressional labor,2 was enacted in 1966' to assure the fullest possible
public access to information held by federal agencies.4 The enactment of
FOIA validated the philosophy that an informed public is essential for the
effective operation of a democracy.5 FOIA requires agencies to publish
certain information in the Federal Register,6 to make other types of infor-
mation available for public inspection and copying7 and to provide, upon
proper request, any other identifiable agency records.' To balance the
public interest in obtaining information against the confidentiality interests
of the government agencies and individuals involved, FOIA exempts nine
specific categories of documents from disclosure.9 Among the exemptions,
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. See Federal Public Records Law (Part I): Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations on HR. 5012, et al., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings on H.R 50121. See also Discussion of the Legislative
History of the Freedom of Information Act, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION SOURCE BOOK:
LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 6-10 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as
FOIA SOURCE BOOK].
3. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
4. See S. REP, No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 2, at 38. "It is the purpose of the present bill to ... establish a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language." Id For an early discussion of FOIA's impact, see generally Davis, The
Information Act. A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967).
5. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 2, at 38.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976).
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). The exemptions are: (1) national defense and foreign
policy secrets; (2) personnel rules and practices; (3) existing statutory exemptions; (4) trade
secrets and business information; (5) governmental memoranda; (6) matters of personal pri-
vacy; (7) investigatory files; (8) financial institution reports; (9) information concerning
wells. The Supreme Court has ruled that the nine exemptions are not mandatory and may
be waived by an agency. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979). See Note,
Chrysler Corp v. Brown: Seeking a Formula for Responsible Disclosure Under the FOL4, 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 159, 174-75 (1979). The Supreme Court also has recognized a congres-
sional intent to limit the scope of the exemptions. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v.
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subsection (b)(2) of FOIA, commonly referred to as exemption 2, provides
protection for matters that are "related solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency."'"
Judicial interpretation of exemption 2 has been burdened by the confus-
ing and often contradictory legislative history surrounding the enactment
of FOIA as a whole" and exemption 2 in particular.' 2 The House and
Senate reports are generally considered to be irreconcilable with regard to
exemption 2. The Senate's interpretation of the exemption limited its
scope to relations between an agency and its employees. In contrast, the
House extended the exemption's reach to include relations between an
agency and the public.
13
In addition, the unusual legislative history of FOIA complicates judicial
treatment of exemption 2. The Senate passed the bill before the House
reported it out of committee. Therefore, the Senate report, with its narrow
interpretation of exemption 2 was before the House when it considered the
exemption. The conflicting interpretations remained intact, however, be-
cause the House committee chose not to amend the wording of the exemp-
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). See also NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1976). Although FOIA was amended in 1967 (Pub. L. No. 90-
23, 81 Stat. 54), 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561), 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1247) and 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1225), exemption 2 has remained unchanged
since FOIA's enactment in 1966. At least one commentator has expressed doubt as to the
exemption's worth. See Davis, supra note 4, at 786. ("No good reason for exempting inter-
nal personnel rules and practices has ever come to my attention. The exemption seems to
me opposed to the basic push to let the public know what the government is doing.")
11. See Davis, supra note 4, at 809. See also Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A
CriticalReview, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150, 153 (1969) ("While recommending passage,
the House Report differed so substantially from its Senate counterpart-so restricted the
spirit of the act-that it, in effect, amended the bill" (footnotes omitted)).
12. Judicial recognition of the conflict between the House and Senate reports as to the
scope of exemption 2 is substantial. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 363 (1976); Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hardy v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 631 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1980); Sladek v. Bensinger, 605
F.2d 899, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1979); Cox v. Levi, 592 F.2d 460, 462 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1979);
Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1978); Cox v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1309 & n.12 (8th Cir. 1978); Hawkes v. IRS,
467 F.2d 787, 796 (6th Cir. 1972). Several commentators have also noted the conflict. See
Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1051
(1975) ("The Senate's interpretation of exemption two is quite different from that of the
House."); Note, supra note 11, at 154 ("[T]he House position on exemption 2 is diametrically
opposed to that of the Senate."). See also Comment, The Status of Law Enforcement Manu-
als Under the Freedom of Information Act, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 734, 747 (1980); Note, The
Freedom of Information Act.: Shredding the Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 694, 716
(1973).
13. See Davis, supra note 4, at 786.
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tion to reflect its own broader interpretation. Instead, the House
considered and approved the language of the exemption as originally
adopted by the Senate." As a result, the outcome of an exemption 2 claim
has, more often than not, hinged on a judicial determination that only one
of the reports is a true reflection of congressional intent.' 5 Although the
Supreme Court has expressed a preference for the Senate interpretation of
exemption 2,16 it has also questioned whether the House report, with its
broader interpretation of the exemption, is the appropriate guide for ex-
emption 2 nondisclosure of "matters of some public interest . . . where
necessary to prevent the circumvention of agency regulations . . . ." '-
In Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the
issue raised by the Supreme Court, and held that a Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) agent training manual was exempt from
disclosure under exemption 2. The court reasoned that the exemption per-
mits the nondisclosure of information that relates predominantly to the
internal workings of an agency which are not the subject of any substan-
tial, valid public interest.' 9 Therefore, it concluded that exemption 2 ap-
plies if the information requested meets a test of "predominant internality"
and its disclosure would pose a significant risk of circumvention of agency
law.2o
Michael Crooker, a prisoner in a federal penitentiary, filed a FOIA re-
quest seeking disclosure of a BATF training manual for new agents. 2' The
manual instructs agents in the techniques of surveillance of premises, vehi-
14. See infra note 40.
15. See, e.g., Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 631 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.
1980) (adopting House report); Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (adopting Senate report); Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587
F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978) (adopting House report); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 576
F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1978) (adopting Senate report); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (adopting Senate report); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972) (adopting
Senate report). But see Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 717
(D.C. Cir.) (reconciling House and Senate reports), vacated on rehearing en banc, 591 F.2d
752 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
16. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
17. Id at 364. For further discussion of Rose, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying
text.
18. 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. Id. at 1057.
20. Id. at 1074.
21. FO1A entitles "any person" to obtain records from federal agencies. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3). The Supreme Court has held that the benefit to be gained by the person re-
questing records from an agency is irrelevent. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 149 (1975).
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cles and individuals. BATF denied Crooker access to portions of the man-
ual, contending that disclosure would benefit those attempting to
circumvent the law, and that exemption 2 permitted nondisclosure.
Crooker brought an action against BATF in the federal district court seek-
ing access to the manual in its entirety.22 The court held that the deleted
portions23 properly fell within exemption 2.24 A panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that because
exemption 2 protects only "internal housekeeping" matters, the deleted
portions of the manual should be disclosed.25 Subsequently, the court of
appeals, sitting en banc, vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district
court's holding. The court held that exemption 2 applies if materials meet
a "test of predominant internality" and disclosure "significantly risks cir-
cumvention of agency regulations .... *26 The court stated that while
FOIA was intended to eliminate secrecy, the need to maintain the effective
operation of federal agencies must also be recognized. Judge McKinnon
27
and Judge Mikva21 filed concurring opinions that were devoted primarily
to a criticism of the dissent. Judge Ginsburg also concurred but ques-
tioned whether the majority reconciled successfully the Crooker rationale
with the result in the District of Columbia Circuit's en banc decision in
Jordan that limited the scope of exemption 2 to trivial "housekeeping"
matters such as pay, vacations, and parking.
29
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Wilkey accused the majority of rewriting the
legislative history of exemption 2. Judge Wilkey emphasized that the pre-
dominant internality standard lacked clarity and could not be applied by
agencies or courts without abuse of discretion. He maintained that the
majority should have been more concerned with construing the law than
with determining what it should be.3 °
22. FOIA provides the right to de novo review in a federal district court of an agency's
decision to refuse disclosure of information within the ambit of the FOIA. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
23. FOIA provides that "[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be pro-
vided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt
under" subsection (b). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
24. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, No. 79-2560 (D.D.C. Feb. 15,
1980), rev'd, No. 80-1278 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1980), vacated, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
25. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, No. 80-1278, slip op. at 7 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 12, 1980), vacated, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
26. 670 F.2d at 1074.
27. Id at 1076-86 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
28. Id at 1086-90 (Mikva, J., concurring).
29. Id at 1090-92 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Jordan v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). For further discussion of Jordan, see infra notes 88-
97 and accompanying text.
30. 670 F.2d at 1093-1122 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
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This Note will examine the statutory framework and the judicial inter-
pretations of exemption 2. Particular emphasis will be placed on the legis-
lative history of exemption 2 and its reflection in exemption 2 case law.
An evaluation of the Crooker decision will suggest that the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit's interpretation of the wording and legislative history of
exemption 2 was influenced more by policy considerations than by the
rules of statutory construction. Finally, the Note will conclude with an
analysis of Crooker's impact on future attempts to deny disclosure under
exemption 2.
I. LEGISLATIVE GUIDES TO EXEMPTION 2
When faced with the issue of whether exemption 2 is applicable to a
particular request for disclosure, most courts begin their analysis with an
examination of the legislative history of the exemption.3 The specific lan-
guage of exemption 2 was first introduced in the Senate during the 88th
Congress32 in S. 1666, a bill to amend the public information section of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).3 3 Exemptions were in-
cluded in three sections of S. 1666.34 The section requiring information to
be published in the Federal Register exempted matters relating solely to
the "internal management of an agency."35 Both the provision requiring
agency opinions, orders, and rules to be made available for public inspec-
tion and the provision requiring an agency to disclose its records contained
exemptions for matters relating "solely to the internal personnel rules and
practices of any agency."36 The Senate report on the bill distinguished the
exemptions, maintaining that the exemptions in the public inspection and
31. FOIA was signed into law on July 4, 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250. Pub. L.
No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, was enacted on June 5, 1967 in order to incorporate into title 5 of the
United States Code, without substantive change, the provisions of Pub. L. No. 89-487
(FOIA). See S. REP. No. 248, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1196.
32. S. 1666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Although S. 1666 was approved by the full
Senate on July 28, 1964, see 110 CONG. REC. 17,086, no action was taken on the Act by the
House before adjournment sine die. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1965),
reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 38-39.
33. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (formerly codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 1002). For a discussion of the inadequacies of § 3 of the APA, see Discussion of the Legis-
lative History of the Freedom of Information Act, FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 6-10.
34. See S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1964), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 2, at 96-98 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT 1219].
35. Id at 96. The wording of this exemption was identical to the exemption 2 contained
in § 3 of the APA, which required disclosure "[e]xcept to the extent there is involved...
(2) any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency." Pub. L. No. 79-
404, § 3(2), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946) (formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1964)).
36. SENATE REPORT 1219, reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 97-98.
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disclosure sections were similar to the "internal management" exemption,
but were "more tightly drawn."37 The principal measures introduced in
the Senate (S. 1160)38 and in the House of Representatives (H.R. 5012)"9
during the 89th Congress, and the legislation as enacted in 1966,4° con-
tained only the exemption for matters "related solely to the internal per-
sonnel rules and practices of an agency."
Portions of the House hearings on H.R. 5012"' and the Senate hear-
37. Id
38. S. 1160, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965). S. 1160, as introduced, was virtually identical
to S. 1666. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 2, at 39.
39. H.R. 5012, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). H.R. 5012 provided in relevant part:
"(c) This section does not authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public except matters that are .. .(2) related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." Id.
40. Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(e)(2), 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966). The chronology of congres-
sional consideration of S. 1160 and H.R. 5012 by the respective houses, as well as the consid-
eration and passage of S. 1160 by the House without amendment, has been of relevance to a
number of courts in weighing the merits of the interpretation given exemption 2 by one
house or the other. The two bills were introduced on the same day, February 17, 1965. The
House conducted its hearings on H.R. 5012 from March 30 to April 5, 1965. See House
Hearings on HR. 5012, supra note 2. The Senate conducted its hearings on S. 1160 from
May 12 to May 21, 1965. See Administrative Procedure Act." Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1160, S.
1336, S, 1758 and S. 1879, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 12-21, 1965) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings on S 1160]. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary recommended pas-
sage of S. 1160 with minor amendments in its report issued on October 4, 1965. See S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at
36-37. The Senate passed the amended bill on October 13, 1965, see I I I CONG. REC. 26,820
(1965), and the House referred the bill to the House Committee on Government Operations
on October 14, 1965. Id. at 27,055. The House committee reported S. 1160 without amend-
ment on May 9, 1966. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in
1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT 1497]. S.
1160 was considered and passed by the House on June 20, 1966. See 112 CONG. REC. 13,007
(1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 2, at 46.
41. See House Hearings on HR. 5012, supra note 2, at 219 (letter from L. Niederiehmer,
Defense Department General Counsel, to Rep. William Dawson, Government Operations
Committee Chairman), 229 (Treasury Department memorandum). The most significant dis-
cussion of the scope of exemption 2 took place on the first day of the House hearings on
H.R. 5012 and included Congressman John F. Moss, Chairman of the Foreign Operations
and Government Information Subcommittee, Benny L. Kass, Counsel to the Subcommittee,
and Norbert A. Schlei, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice:
Mr. Kass. Mr. Schlei, what is your interpretation of exemption No. 2? .. .
Mr. Schlei. Well, we were inclined to be critical of that exception because it did
not seem to us actually that the personnel rules and practices of an agency, many of
them, ought to be exempt. . ..
Mr. Moss. What this was intended to cover was instances such as the manuals
[Vol. 32:317
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ings42 and the House debate43 on S. 1160 have been of some guidance to
courts in construing exemption 2. Courts confronting exemption 2 nondis-
closure, however, have focused primarily on the Senate and House reports
on S. 1160. The Senate report accompanying S. 1160 states that the ex-
emption "relates only to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel's use of parking
facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave,
and the like."" The House report on exemption 2 broadened its scope to
include "operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Gov-
ernment investigators or examiners." The House report further states that
the exemption would not include all "'matters of internal management'
such as employee relations and working conditions and routine adminis-
trative procedures" which already could be legally withheld.45
of procedure that are handed to an examiner-a bank examiner, or a savings and
loan examiner, or the guidelines given to an FBI agent.
Mr. Schlei. Ah! Then the word "personnel" should be stricken. Because "per-
sonnel" I think connoted certainly to use [sic] the employee relations, employee
management rules and practices of an agency. What you meant was material re-
lated solely to the internal rules and practices of any agency for the guidance of its
employees-something like that ...
But I think that word "personnel" does not do the job well enough, Mr. Chair-
man. I am sure it can be done.
Mr. Moss. We will hope to seek a way of doing the job without exempting
internal rules and practices.
Mr. Schlei. I suppose that could cover quite a lot of ground, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moss. Because I am afraid that we would there [sic] open the barn door to
everything.
Oh, we recognize the difficulty and the complexity, but we are perfectly willing
to work at it.
Id. at 29-30. Mr. Kass later testified at the Senate hearings on the proposed amendments to
FOIA that the House report had been an effort to change the meaning of the bill without
amending it, in order to placate the bill's opponents and avoid an implied presidential veto.
See Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government: Hearings on S. 1142
et al. before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Intergovern-
mental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations (Vol. 2), 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 122-26 (1973) (testimony of Benny L. Kass).
42. See Senate Hearings on S. 1160, supra note 40, at 34. "The investigative manuals of
the Secret Service and the Bureau of Narcotics, for example, contain information the release
of which would only be of assistance to criminals. . . . Surely such information should be
protected." Id (statement of Edwin F. Rains, Assistant General Counsel, Department of
the Treasury).
43. See 112 CONG. REC. 13,659 (1965).
44. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 2, at 43.
45. See HOUSE REPORT 1497, supra note 40, at 2428.
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In addition to the legislative materials dealing specifically with exemp-
tion 2, courts have examined other legislative guides. In order to glean the
legislative intent behind exemption 2, courts have looked to the legislative
history of FOIA subsection (a)(2)(C),46 the 1974 amendments to FOIA ex-
emption 7, which concerns certain investigatory files,47 and the Govern-
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1976). Section (a)(2)(C) of the FOIA provides: "(2) Each
agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and
copying . . . (C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member
of the public." The original version of the FOIA introduced in the Senate did not contain
the word "administrative." See S. 1160, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The term "administra-
tive" was added by amendment and explained as follows: "The limitation of... [disclo-
sure] to administrative matters rather than to law enforcement matters protects the
traditional confidential nature of instructions to Government personnel prosecuting viola-
tions of law in court, while permitting a public examination of the basis for administrative
action." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 2, at 37. As with exemption 2, the House report gave a broader reading to
§ 552(a)(2)(C):
[A]n agency may not be required to make available those portions of its staff man-
ual and instructions which set forth criteria or guidelines for the staff in auditing or
inspecting procedures, or in the selection or handling of cases, such as operational
tactics, allowable tolerances, or criteria for defense, prosecution or settlement of
cases.
HousE REPORT 1497, supra note 40, at 2424-25. The conflicting interpretations given by the
two houses have been noted. See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A. 12 (1st
ed. Supp. 1970).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). Prior to the 1974 amendments to FOIA, exemption 7
had exempted from disclosure "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes
except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." Pub. L. No. 90-23,
§ 552(b)(7), 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967). The amended version of exemption 7 reads as follows:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudica-
tion, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal
law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential
information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law en-
forcement personnel.
Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b)(7), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(1976)). As explained in the conference committee report, the exemption as amended:
would permit an agency to withhold investigatory records compiled for law en-
forcement purposes only to the extent that the production of such records would
interfere with enforcement proceedings, deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or
an impartial adjudication, constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, disclose the identity of an informer, or disclose investigative techniques
and procedures.




ment in the Sunshine Act of 1976.48 Therefore, the scope of exemption 2
has depended on which of the above legislative guides or combination
thereof a court has relied upon to interpret the exemption.
II. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF EXEMPTION 2
4. The Eary Cases-A Narrow Interpretation
An early case recognizing the conflict between the House and Senate
interpretations of exemption 2 was Hawkes v. Internal Revenue Service.4 9
In Hawkes, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed whether exemption 2 protected portions of an Internal Revenue
Service manual that described procedures for the examination of tax re-
turns and the interrogation of taxpayers. In examining the legislative his-
tory of exemption 2, the court noted the total disagreement between the
reports of the congressional committees50 and chose to rely on the Senate
report. It reasoned that the literal wording of the exemption favored the
Senate's interpretation. 5 The court noted that because the Senate report
was before the House when it considered and approved the exemption as
originally drafted, reliance on the House report would allow one house of
Congress to effectively change the interpretation given to proposed legisla-
tion by the other house without amending a word of text.52
In Hawkes, the government also resisted disclosure under FOIA subsec-
48. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976)). The Act included the specific wording of exemption 2 of FOIA.
See Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241, 1242 (1976). Subsection (c)(2) exempts from
the Act's open meeting requirement portions of meetings that are likely to "relate solely to
the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(2) (1976). The
accompanying House report interpreted the provision to "protect the privacy of staff mem-
bers and to cover the handling of strictly internal affairs. It does not include discussion or
information dealing with agency policies governing employees' dealings with the public such
as manuals setting forth job functions or procedures." H. REP. No. 880 (Part I), 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2188, 2191. See also S.
REP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975) (specifically noting the relationship between
FOIA exemption 2 and 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(2) (1976)).
49. 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
50. 467 F.2d at 796. Prior to Hawkes, other courts also noted the conffict between the
two reports. See Stern v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (D.D.C. 1973); Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), afdon other grounds, 415 F.2d
878 (9th Cir. 1969). But see Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'don other
grounds sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
51. 467 F.2d at 797.
52. Id The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied a similar anal-
ysis in Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973) (exemption 2 does not exempt in-
struction and student manual used by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
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tion (a)(2)(C), which requires the release of administrative staff manuals.
The government asserted that the legislative intent behind that subsection
was to exempt from disclosure staff manuals dealing with law enforcement
matters. 53  The court held that the implicit exemption in subsection
(a)(2)(C) for law enforcement materials should be applied narrowly. The
court reasoned that information should be protected from disclosure only
if its release would significantly impede the law enforcement process.54
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
gave a more extensive treatment to exemption 2 in Vaughn v. Rosen.5 The
court held that Civil Service Commission reports of agency-wide personnel
management evaluations were not exempt from disclosure by exemption
2.56 Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkey noted the conflict between the
two congressional reports and, in holding that the Senate report was more
reflective of congressional intent, stated that the scope of exemption 2 was
limited to disclosure of "routine housekeeping matters in which it can be
presumed the public lacks any substantial interest,"57 The court noted that
the Commission reports concerned compliance with regulations promul-
gated to promote labor-management relations, employment of Vietnam
veterans, and equal opportunity programs. Because the reports had been
the "focus of legitimate public interest and attention" and were related to
policies and procedures common to many agencies, the court held that
they were not exempt from disclosure under exemption 2.58 A concurrence
53. 467 F.2d at 794. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
54. 467 F.2d at 795. The court felt that disclosure of the IRS manual would aid law
enforcement by "encouraging knowledgeable and voluntary compliance with the law." Id
For support of the § 522(a)(2)(C) implicit exemption, see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 5.4, 5.30 (2d ed. Supp. 1980).
55. 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
56. Id at 1143.
57. Id at 1141. The preference in Vaughn for the Senate report was based on rationales
that are often cited to justify a determination that the Senate view, rather than that of the
House, should be adopted. These rationales include a belief that the Senate report wording
is more faithful to the overall intent of FOIA and is a more workable guide for courts and
agencies in deciding which information should be disclosed. Courts have also observed that
the House committee was under political pressure to amend the bill to provide greater pro-
tection for law enforcement materials; that it was unable or unwilling to do so by amend-
ment or in conference with the Senate, and instead elected to appease the bill's opponents by
broadening the exemptions through language in the House report. Furthermore, courts
have noted that the Senate report was the only item of legislative history before both houses
of Congress. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Jordan v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Cox v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 576 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1978); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
58. 523 F.2d at 1143. The court's characterization of the programs as the focus of legiti-
mate public interest was based on a discussion by the Second Circuit dealing with factors
relevant to a determination of the scope of exemption 2 as interpreted by the Senate report.
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by Judge Leventhal suggested that the words "related solely," which qual-
ify the phrase "internal personnel rules and practices," should be given the
construction of "relating predominantly." He reasoned that because the
word "relating" is potentially all-encompassing and the word "solely" is
potentially all-excluding, the word "predominantly" avoids either
extreme.
59
B. New Direction from the Supreme Court?
In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,6" the Supreme Court adopted the
District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning in Vaughn. The Court held that
case summaries of hearings on infractions of the Honor and Ethics Code at
the Air Force Academy were not exempt from disclosure by exemption
2.6 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted that courts that had
previously relied on the House report to prevent disclosure of information
of some public interest did so because disclosure would risk circumvention
of agency regulations.62 Because Rose concerned materials which, if dis-
closed, involved no risk of circumvention of the law, the Court declined to
consider the appropriateness of the House report's interpretation of ex-
emption 2.63 Therefore, the Court held that "at least where the situation is
not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation, Ex-
emption 2 is not applicable to matters subject to such a genuine and signif-
icant public interest."'
Id at 1143 n.27 (citing Rose v. Department of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 265 (2d Cir.
1974), a#'d, 425 U.S. 352 (1976)). In contrast to the Vaughn court, other courts have used
the phrase "legitimate public interest" to connote a "lawful" or "risk-free" public interest.
See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
59. Id at 1150-51 (Leventhal, J., concurring). In response to the majority's assertion
that the Senate report was the only report before both houses, Judge Leventhal noted that
"the realities of the legislative process" make it doubtful that the Senate report was consid-
ered by the House. He also suggested that the Senate report's examples were "illustrative,
not definitional or exclusive." Id at 1148.
60. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
61. Id at 370.
62. Id. at 364. The three cases cited by Justice Brennan were Tietze v. Richardson, 342
F. Supp. 610 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (Social Security claims processing guidelines); Cuneo v. Laird,
338 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1972) ("playbook" parts of defense contract audit manual), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977; City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (Bureau of
Customs manual describing surveillance methods for violators of the law).
63. 425 U.S. at 364.
64. Id at 369. The public interest standard enunciated in Rose was the basis for the
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Maroscia v. Levi,
569 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1977), that administrative markings, initials, and routings stamps
used in FBI files were exempt from disclosure by exemption 2. Id at 1001-02. The court
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C The Impact of Rose
In Cox v. United States Department of Justice,65 the Justice Department
argued that a Drug Enforcement Administration manual was protected
from disclosure by exemption 2. Although the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit remanded on the question of what portions of
the manual were to be disclosed, it cited Rose and stated that subsection
"(b)(2) exempts only 'housekeeping' matters in which 'the public could not
reasonably be expected to have an interest.' ,66 The court also conducted
an extensive analysis of the interrelation between subsection (a)(2)(C),
which provides for the inspection and copying of administrative staff
manuals,67 and (a)(3), which provides for disclosure of agency records
upon proper request.68  The court concluded that the specific legislative
intent to exclude certain law enforcement materials from disclosure under
subsection (a)(2)(C) precluded disclosure of these same materials under
the general intent of subsection (a)(3) even without the aid of the specific
exemption in subsection (b).69 In addition, the court noted that although
exemption (b)(7), which relates to investigatory files, did not apply to the
Drug Enforcement Administrative manual, it could be used to show Con-
reasoned that these materials were exempt because they were "matters in which the public
interest is minimal." Id at 1002.
A similar request for disclosure was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1978). The Nix court granted
exemption 2 withholding to a request for FBI routing stamps, initials, and file numbers
because the materials were "at most routine matters of mere internal significance and, as
such, [were] protected from disclosure by subsection 2." Id at 1005.
65. 576 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1978).
66. Id at 1310 (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369 (1976)).
67. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) provides:
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which
(A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with pub-
lished rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed,
shall make the records promptly available to any person.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). While the Cox court relied on the discussion in Hawkes regard-
ing the distinction between administrative and law enforcement matters, see supra notes 53-
54 and accompanying text, it took the analysis one step further by noting specifically the
relationship between § 552(a)(2)(C) and (a)(3). 576 F.2d at 1306-09. For a discussion of the
relationship of the two sections, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 56
(1976) ("Even if none of the nine exemptions applies, some records may be free from re-
quired disclosure under (a)(3) because of the legislative intent behind (a)(2)"). See also4tt),
Gen. 1974 FOA Amendments Mem. 21-22, reprinted in FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
TEXTS AND OTHER SOURCES 531-32 (Jt. Comm. Print 1975).
69. 576 F.2d at 1306-09.
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gress' intent to restrict access to some law enforcement materials.70
Shortly after Cox was decided, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit developed a rationale for enlarging the scope of exemp-
tion 2 in Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms.7 The court
permitted nondisclosure of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
manual dealing with raids and searches. The court reasoned that in situa-
tions in which disclosure would risk physical harm to law enforcement
personnel, Rose did not foreclose adopting the House report's interpreta-
tion of exemption 2.72 The court noted that subsection (a)(2)(C) had been
interpreted by other courts to provide withholding of the manual in ques-
tion. The Second Circuit, however, declined to exempt the manual under
this subsection. Instead, the court reasoned that the legislative intent be-
hind exemption 2 may be gleaned by considering the Senate report in its
entirety. Moreover, a reading of both the House and Senate reports on
subsections (b)(2) and (a)(2)(C) evidenced an intent that the manual be
withheld on the basis of exemption 2.7 Therefore, the court held that ex-
emption 2 exempts from disclosure internal agency matters where disclo-
sure might risk circumvention of agency law.74
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
announced two apparently contradictory decisions concerning exemption
2 in Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Administration75 and Jor-
dan v. United States Department of Justice.7 6 In Ginsburg, a three judge
panel held, by a two to one vote, that Federal Energy Administration
(FEA) guidelines to agency auditors concerning compliance with the
agency's oil price regulations were exempt from disclosure by exemption
2.7 7 Judge McKinnon, writing for the majority, made a more significant
attempt to justify reliance on the House report than had been made by the
70. Id at 1308. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
71. 587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978).
72. Id at 547.
73. Id. at 548. The reasoning in Caplan is weak in several aspects. If § 552(a)(2)(C)
indicates a legislative intent to create a complete exemption for certain law enforcement
materials, the inclusion of subsection (b)(2) to also exempt these materials is superfluous. A
more reasoned reconciliation of the two sections was expressed in Jordan v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See infra note 90 and accompanying
text. For a more extensive treatment of Caplan, see Comment, supra note 12, at 752-53
n.101.
74. 587 F.2d at 548.
75. 591 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on rehearing en bane, 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir.
1978), afg by an equally divided court, Civ. No. 76-0027 (D.D.C. June 18, 1976), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 906 (1979).
76. 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
77. 591 F.2d at 730-31. The court also held that the guidelines were implicitly exempt
from disclosure under § 552(a)(2)(C). Id at 721.
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Second Circuit in Caplan. The Ginsburg majority reasoned that the phrase
"internal personnel rules and practices" should be read partially in the
disjunctive as "internal personnel rules" and "internal practices." The
court concluded that by construing the words "internal personnel" to mod-
ify only the word "rules" both reports could be given effect. 78 The major-
ity supported this construction by noting that the Senate report had limited
itself to examples of rules, while the House report, by providing examples
of practices, had in fact, narrowed the scope of the exemption by supple-
menting and clarifying the Senate report. The court concluded that rather
than being contradictory, the two reports were complimentary. Because
the House report was published after the Senate report, the majority rea-
soned that it was actually a more complete assessment of congressional
intent.79 The majority asserted that even if the two reports were seen to
conflict, Rose does not preclude the use of exemption 2 where disclosure
would risk circumvention of agency law.8"
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wilkey asserted that FOIA's remedial
nature mandated a liberal reading of the disclosure sections, and a narrow
construction of the exemptions. Therefore, even if the guidelines did fall
under the implicit exemptions of subsection (a)(2)(C) they would still have
to be disclosed under subsection (a)(3) unless a specific exemption in sub-
section (b) applied."s With regard to exemption 2, Judge Wilkey criticized
the majority's grammatical construction of the exemption. He noted that
the designation of "personnel" as modifying both "rules and practices"
could be traced directly to congressional dissatisfaction with the overly
broad "internal management" exemption in former section 3 of the APA.82
He stated the reasons he had previously expressed in Vaughn for prefer-
ring the Senate report83 and provided evidence of "last minute chicanery
by interested members of the House" to account for the conflicting re-
ports.84 In addition, Judge Wilkey cited the House report on the Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act as further evidence of Congress' intent that
78. Id at 724.
79. Id at 724-25.
80. Id. at 730. The Crooker majority conceded that the reports conflicted in one re-
spect-minor employment matters-which would be exempted by the Senate and disclosed
by the House report. The court concluded that "[tihe contradiction in this minor respect
does not make the non-contradictory parts of the two reports become contradictory ....
Id. at 725 n.17.
81. 591 F.2d at 740 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
82. Id at 742-44. Judge Wilkey noted that the House hearings on H.R. 5012 did not
reveal an intent, even by FOIA's opponents, to separate the word "personnel" from "inter-
nal practices." Id at 742. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
83. 591 F.2d at 745-46. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
84. 591 F.2d at 746-47. See supra note 41.
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exemption 2 be given the narrow interpretation reflected in the 1965 Sen-
ate report on FOIA.85 Finally, Judge Wilkey did not agree that the Rose
Court implied that exemption 2 could be invoked to protect matters where
disclosure may risk circumvention of the law. 6
The Ginsburg panel decision was subsequently vacated, and the court,
sitting en banc, affirmed by a four to four decision the lower court's judg-
ment that FEA guidelines were exempt from disclosure under exemption
2.87 On the same day, the court decided Jordan v. United States Depart-
ment of Justice.88 Judge Wilkey, who dissented in Ginsburg, was the au-
thor of the seven to two majority opinion in Jordan. The court, in an
opinion substantially similar to Judge Wilkey's dissent in Ginsburg,9 held
that documents dealing with the prosecutorial discretion of an United
States Attorney are not exempt from disclosure by exemption 2.90 Judge
Wilkey noted that the interpretive comma found by the Ginsburg panel to
separate "internal personnel rules" from "practices" was violative of basic
grammar and that Congress could have added the word "the" before the
word "practices" if this severance had been intended.9 Judge Wilkey em-
phasized that the word "personnel" was the major obstacle facing the gov-
ernment's attempt to avoid disclosure because the guidelines were "simply
not 'personnel' rules or practices."92
Concurring in the decision, Judge Bazelon stressed that one of the main
85. 591 F.2d at 747. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
86. 591 F.2d at 749.
87. Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Admin., 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
88. 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
89. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
90. 591 F.2d at 771. The majority opinion also held that although material may not be
disclosed under § 552(a)(2)(C), it is nevertheless disclosable under § 552(a)(3) unless one of
the nine exemptions apply. Id at 762. Judge Wilkey reasoned that Congress did not intend
to give complete protection to law enforcement materials but had only intended to protect
them from automatic public indexing and disclosure under § 552(a)(2) and not from disclo-
sure on demand under § 552(a)(3). Id
91. Id at 763-64.
92. Id at 763. Several unpublished decisions of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia have shown a reluctance to follow Jordan's strict interpretation of ex-
emption 2. See Zamnik v. United States Dep't of State, C.A. No. 79-1072 (D.D.C. Aug. 28,
1979) (using exemption 2 to deny disclosure of a manual relating to protective services for
the President); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, C.A. No. 78-1944 (D.D.C. May 8,
1979) (using exemption 2 to protect portions of a Drug Enforcement Administration man-
ual); Sturgeon v. Department of Treasury, C.A. No. 77-1961, mem. op. at 4-5 (D.D.C. Jan.
30, 1979) (using exemption 2 to exempt portions of a United States Secret Service manual
dealing with investigative methods).
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purposes of FOIA is to eliminate secret agency law93 and that disclosure of
the documents in question would assure that prosecutorial discretion was
exercised properly.94 Judge Leventhal, who did not participate in the en
banc Ginsburg decision, also concurred but differed with Judge Wilkey's
emphasis on the word "personnel." He asserted that the critical words
were "solely" and "internal" and that exemption 2 applies if the informa-
tion is "related solely to the internal personnel rules or to the internal prac-
tices of an agency."95 Judge Leventhal agreed with the majority in the
vacated Ginsburg panel that the Senate report did not conflict with the
House report because the Senate report only provided a nonexhaustive list
of examples covered by exemption 2.96 Completing the conflict within the
court, Judge McKinnon, the author of the majority opinion in the vacated
Ginsburg panel decision, dissented, contending that subsection (a)(2)(C)
completely exempted the guidelines from disclosure.97
The District of Columbia Circuit attempted to reconcile its internal disa-
greement concerning the scope of exemption 2 in Cox v. United States De-
partment of Justice.98 In a per curiam panel opinion, the court held that a
United States Marshal's manual detailing methods of restraining and
transporting prisoners was protected from disclosure by exemption 2.99
The court constructed an amalgamated rule for exemption 2 cases that
would require disclosure of "secret law," but would not require either dis-
closure of the strategies employed by agency personnel in enforcing the
law or routine internal matters in which the public lacks a legitimate
interest. 100
93. 591 F.2d at 781 (Bazelon, J., concurring) (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975)).
94. 591 F.2d at 781.
95. Id at 782 (emphasis in original) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
96. Id at 783. Judge Leventhal expressed sympathy for the subsection (a)(2)(C) im-
plicit exemption for law enforcement materials in the event that exemption 2 was interpreted
to be inapplicable. Id at 784.
97. Id at 789 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
98. 601 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
99. Id at 5.
100. Id at 4. The exemption 2 rule formulated by the Cox court combined elements of
Rose, Jordan, and the vacated Ginsburg opinion. Although the court cited the majority
opinion in Jordan for its discussion of secret law, id (citing 591 F.2d at 763), only Judge
Bazelon's concurrence in Jordan was concerned with secret law. 591 F.2d at 781. In addi-
tion, the Cox majority (Judges McKinnon and Robb), who had dissented in Jordan, at-
tempted to harmonize Jordan's majority opinion with its other concurrence as well as with
the en bane affirmance in Ginsburg. Id at 5 n.2. The court reasoned that the manual at
issue in Cox was more similar to the undisclosed FEA guidelines in Ginsburg than the
United States Attorney's Manual that had been disclosed in Jordan. The court stated that
the Cox manual did not contain "secret law" which was Jordan's primary focus and that it
met the test of predominant internality suggested by Judge Leventhal in his Jordan concur-
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Shortly after Cox, the District of Columbia Circuit varied the public
interest standard of Rose in Lesar v. United States Department of Jus-
tice.' ' The court held that exemption 2 applied to symbols used by the
FBI to refer to its informants in records and documents dealing with the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'° 2 Judge Wilkey, writing for
the majority, reasoned that the symbols were matters of internal signifi-
cance in which the public had no substantial or legitimate interest and
were therefore exempt from disclosure. 0 3
In Hardy v. Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,'°" the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District of Columbia
Circuit's legitimate interest test articulated in Cox. 15 The court held that
portions of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms manual dealing
with raids and searches, which had also been at issue in Caplan, were ex-
empt from disclosure because they were law enforcement materials, disclo-
sure of which may risk circumvention of agency regulations."0 6 The court
reviewed the other two approaches used by the circuits to exempt law en-
forcement materials and rejected the approach taken by the Fifth, Sixth
and Eighth Circuits'0 7 as unfaithful to the structure of FOIA, which re-
quires full disclosure except in the case of a specific exemption in subsec-
rence. Id. The court also asserted that "absent the compulsion of Jordan," it would adhere
to its view that (a)(2)(C) provided complete protection for the portions of the manual at
issue. Id. at 4 n.l.
101. 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also Sladek v. Bensinger, 605 F.2d 899 (5th Cir.
1979) (utilizing public interest standard to exempt under exemption 2 portions of DEA man-
ual dealing with entry plans).
102. 636 F.2d at 485-86.
103. 1d Judge Wilkey's opinion was based more on policy considerations than a strict
reading of exemption 2. The symbols'
only real value lies in their use as a mechanism to control the internal and external
dissemination of the actual identities of FBI informants. Since the public has no
legitimate interest in gaining information that could lead to the exposure of confi-
dential sources referred to in criminal investigative files, we uphold the claimed
exemption.
Id at 486 (footnote omitted). The "legitimate public interest" standard is a useful rationale
for withholding by a court that is unsympathetic to the House interpretation but not una-
ware of the risks involved in disclosure of certain "quasi-personnel" information.
104. 631 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. Id at 656. The court asserted that although the result reached by employing the
legitimate interest standard might not differ from its own, the standard "places courts in the
difficult position of determining when the interest of the public ... is 'legitimate.'" Id
106. Id at 657. The court reasoned that "materials instructing law enforcement agents
on how to investigate violations concern internal personnel practices." Id. at 656. The court
also indicated that exemption 7 provided support for its exemption 2 interpretation. ("This
exemption [7] would be pointless unless the manual instructing agents in those techniques
and procedures were also exempt from disclosure.") Id.
107. Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1307-09 (8th Cir. 1978); Stokes
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tion (b).' Aligning itself with the Second Circuit's reasoning in
Caplan, 09 the court asserted that the decision in Rose did not foreclose
reliance on the House report to use exemption 2 to withhold materials that
could aid in the circumvention of the law." 10
The District of Columbia Circuit revived its emphasis on the meaning of
the word "personnel" in exemption 2 in Allen v. Central Intelligence
Agency. ' The court held that portions of documents containing filing
and routing instructions were not exempt from disclosure by exemption
2.112 The court referred to the Senate report and noted that filing and
routing instructions "are plainly not included in that narrow category of
administrative personnel rules and are totally unlike any of the examples
cited" in the Senate report.' 13
The Supreme Court's decision in Rose and the federal courts of appeals'
decisions concerning exemption 2 thus demonstrate that courts have used a
variety of approaches in defining the scope of exemption 2. Within the
District of Columbia Circuit alone, each approach has surfaced at one
time or another." 4 Therefore, it was not surprising that the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized a need to
clarify and refine its position on exemption 2.
v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 794-95 (6th
Cir. 1972).
108. 631 F.2d at 656-57. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976), supra note 68; 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)
("This section [of FOIA] does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availa-
bility of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section ...."). See also S.
REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note
2, at 45 ("The purpose of [§ 552(c)] is to make it clear beyond doubt that all materials of the
Government are to be made available to the public. . . unless explicitly allowed to be kept
secret by one of the exemptions in subsection [(b)]" (emphasis in original)).
109. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
110. 631 F.2d at 657.
111. 636 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
112. Id at 1290.
113. Id
114. See, e.g., Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(denying disclosure based on a lack of either substantial or legitimate public interest); Jor-
dan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (limiting
exemption to trivial personnel matters); Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Federal Energy Ad-
min., 591 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated on rehearing en banc, 591 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir.
1978), a~'g by an equally divided court, Civ. No. 76-0027 (D.D.C. June 18, 1976), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 906 (1979) (exempting from disclosure materials that might risk circumvention of
agency law); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (denying disclosure of mater-
ials in which the public lacks a substantial interest).
[Vol. 32:317
FOJA Exemption 2
III. CROOKER v BUREAU OFALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS
A. Judicial Legislation or Statutory Interpretation?
In Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,"5 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed
whether disclosure of material that might risk circumvention of agency
regulations was included within the scope of exemption 2. Although it
ruled that exemption 2 is applicable where a document meets a test of
predominant internality and its disclosure would significantly risk circum-
vention of agency law," 6 the court failed to provide persuasive reasoning
for this interpretation of the exemption's scope.
Writing for the majority, Judge Edwards examined the scope of exemp-
tion 2 by noting the interpretation of the language of the exemption pro-
posed by Judge Leventhal in his concurring opinions in Vaughn 1  and
Jordan."8 The court agreed that the word "solely" should be given the
construction of "predominantly" and that exemption 2 exempts internal
personnel rules and internal practices of an agency from mandatory disclo-
sure.' "9 The court held that the protection from disclosure afforded by the
exemption is not limited to minor employment matters. According to the
court, the exemption also protects other rules and practices that govern
agency personnel, including training manuals for agency law enforcement
personnel. 
20
The court then proceeded to examine the legislative history of FOIA in
general and exemption 2 in particular. In addition to a philosophy of full
agency disclosure, the majority found a concern for confidentiality in both
the Senate and House legislative history on FOIA. With regard to exemp-
tion 2, the court noted statements in the House hearings, report, and de-
bate that exemption 2 was intended to protect internal instructions to law
enforcement agents from mandatory disclosure. The court asserted that
this intent was not contradicted by the Senate report, which gave only a
nonexclusive list of materials falling within exemption 2. Therefore, the
115. 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
!16. Id. at 1074. The court stressed that the addition of the word "significantly" would
insure a narrow interpretation of the scope of exemption 2. Id
117. 523 F.2d 1136, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Leventhal, J., concurring). See supra note 59
and accompanying text.
118. 591 F.2d 753, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring). See supra
note 95 and accompanying text.
119. 670 F.2d at 1056-57 (citing Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (Leventhal, J., concurring) and Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753,
783 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal, J., concurring)).
120. 670 F.2d at 1056.
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court concluded that because the Senate report had been silent on the is-
sue, both houses had agreed that materials that might aid in the circum-
vention of agency regulations were exempt.'
2 1
Almost as an afterthought, the court concluded that not only were the
House and Senate interpretations not contradictory concerning disclosure
of sensitive law enforcement materials, but that the two reports were to-
tally reconcilable. The court determined that although the Senate report
dealt with minor matters and the House report focused on more substan-
tial concerns, both reports revealed an intent to exempt from disclosure
internal personnel matters that lacked a legitimate public interest. The
court then rejected a judicial application of the legitimate public interest
test, stating that by enacting FOIA, Congress had already determined what
constituted a legitimate public interest. 22 The court also indicated that
the wording and legislative history of subsections (a)(2)(C) and (b)(7)(E)
further demonstrate a legislative concern for the protection of law enforce-
ment materials.
23
In reviewing the case law on exemption 2, the court asserted that the
Rose Court substantiated the claim that exemption 2 was intended to pro-
tect internal agency materials where disclosure might risk circumvention
of agency law.'24 The court traced the treatment of the exemption in the
District of Columbia Circuit. It concluded that the Vaughn interpretation
of exemption 2 was too superficial, and that Jordan did not concern docu-
ments which, if disclosed, would risk circumvention of the law. The court
noted that the result in Cox, nondisclosure of a United States Marshal's
manual dealing with restraint and transportation of prisoners, was incon-
sistent with the Jordan rationale which limited exemption 2 to minor
"housekeeping" matters. 25 The Crooker court examined the case law in
the other circuits that dealt with disclosure of investigative manuals. The
majority asserted that while the Sixth and Eighth Circuits rejected exemp-
tion 2 as a vehicle to exempt materials where disclosure might risk circum-
vention of the law, the two circuits exempted these materials under
subsection (a)(2)(C). The court concluded that such a treatment of subsec-
tion (a)(2)(C) directly supported its own belief that Congress did not in-
tend to disclose law enforcement materials.' 26 The court also noted that
121. Id at 1058-61.
122. Id at 1065-66.
123. Id See also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
124. -670 F.2d at 1066. The Supreme Court in Rose noted three district courts that fol-
lowed the House report. 425 U.S. at 364. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
125. 670 F.2d at 1067-69.
126. Id at 1070-71. The Crooker court rejected the rationale that § 552(a)(2)(C) com-
pletely exempts the BATF manual from disclosure. It left undisturbed the Jordan holding
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the Second and Ninth Circuits determined that exemption 2 applies to dis-
closure of sensitive law enforcement material. 27 The court then asserted
that with the exception of the District of Columbia Circuit in Jordan, every
federal circuit court that has considered the release of documents which
might aid in circumvention of the law has denied disclosure.
Aligning itself with the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits, the
court held that portions of the BATF manual were exempt from disclosure
under exemption 2.' 28 In support of its holding, the court asserted that its
decision was "hardly surprising" because Congress certainly did not intend
that FOIA undermine federal "criminal statutes and the effectiveness of
law enforcement agencies."'129 Finally, the court rejected the Jordan inter-
pretation of exemption 2, contending that it did not "appear to comport
with the full congressional intent underlying FOIA."' 3 ° The court
stressed, however, that the result in Jordan would be the same under the
two-prong test for materials that are predominantly internal and whose
revelation may risk circumvention of the law. The court reasoned that
exemption 2 would not apply to the prosecutorial guidelines in Jordan
which were a source of "secret law" and were not predominantly internal
even if they might have given some aid to those wishing to circumvent the
law.
13 1
Judge Ginsburg's concurring opinion criticized the majority's adherence
to the result in Jordan. Ginsburg argued that in order to justify the result
in Jordan, the Crooker majority either determined that the prosecutorial
guidelines were not predominantly internal or that their disclosure would
not significantly risk circumvention of the law. Because the district court
in Jordan had made no factual determination of the latter, the result in
Jordan would have to rest on a determination that, unlike the BATF man-
ual, the guidelines were not predominantly internal. Judge Ginsburg,
however, stated that she would find no distinction between the two types of
material, as both instructed agency personnel in performance of their du-
ties. She suggested that the majority's inclusion of "secret law" as a factor
distinguishing Jordan from Crooker could be a viable basis for reconciling
the two opinions. Nevertheless, she criticized the majority for not elabo-
rating on this point, and for failing to provide courts with satisfactory
that a specific section (b) exemption must apply for complete nondisclosure. 670 F.2d at
1055 n. I1 (citing Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 760-63 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (en banc)).
127. 670 F.2d at 1072.
128. Id at 1072-73.
129. Id at 1074.
130. Id at 1075.
131. Id
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guidelines to determine whether cases are governed by the Crooker rea-
soning or the Jordan result.'
32
In his dissent, Judge Wilkey asserted that the majority's repudiation of
the Jordan rationale was not based on any new information uncovered in
the legislative history of exemption 2, but instead on "a great deal of new
interpretation."'33 Judge Wilkey accused the majority of assuming the role
of a congressional conference committee in order to "work out a compro-
mise which it thinks years after the event might have been acceptable to
both houses." 34 He emphasized that, in fact, with the passage of the Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act in 1976, a legislative compromise had been
reached. Judge Wilkey noted that, in explaining the Sunshine Act's own
identically worded exemption 2, the House report to the Sunshine Act
adopted the 1966 Senate report's interpretation of FOIA's exemption 2. 35
Judge Wilkey maintained that the majority's interpretation of exemp-
tion 2 neglected to attach any significance to the word "personnel" or to
refute Jordan's holding that the word is critical to an exemption 2 determi-
nation. In addition, he noted that Rose endorsed the Vaughn majority's
interpretation of exemption 2 and therefore impliedly rejected the con-
struction offered by Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in Vaughn.13 6
The dissent criticized the majority's attempt to reconcile the House and
Senate reports' treatment of exemption 2 and noted that even the Second
and Ninth Circuits, with which the majority agreed as to the scope of the
exemption, did not attempt to deny the conflict in the reports. 137 He as-
serted that the Senate and House hearings and the House debate merely
provide evidence of dissatisfaction with the wording of the exemption, not
an "unequivocal" indication that those testifying before the committees
believed that the exemption was to cover law enforcement materials. 38
Judge Wilkey also criticized the majority's emphasis on a legislative
concern for law enforcement materials. He asserted that subsections
(a)(2)(C) and (b)(7) revealed no more than a congressional intent to pro-
vide limited protection to certain types of information, and only in very
specific settings. 13  With regard to the majority's analysis of the case law
on exemption 2, Judge Wilkey criticized its result-oriented approach and
132. Id at 1090-92 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
133. Id at 1093 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
134. Id (emphasis in original).
135. Id at 1093-94. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
136. 670 F.2d at 1094-95.
137. Id at 1097 & n.24.
138. Id at 1103. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
139. 670 F.2d at 1105-11.
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noted that only the Second and Ninth Circuits had exempted law enforce-
ment materials under exemption 2. "
Judge Wilkey then focused on the majority's new two-prong standard
for exemption 2 withholding. He asserted that the predominant internality
standard not only lacks clarity, but forces judges to make an assessment of
public interest which the majority claimed had already been assessed by
Congress. He asserted that if a document is predominantly internal, then
its impact on the public is slight. This impact can only be determined by a
judicial assessment that the public has no significant interest in disclosure.
Because both prongs of the test must be met before a court denies disclo-
sure, Judge Wilkey suggested that the standard could never be met. He
reasoned that if information is sufficiently substantial to enable persons to
circumvent the law, then it necessarily has an impact on the public. Con-
sequently, the information would not meet the predominant internality
test. A judge would then have to choose between the two standards.
Judge Wilkey predicted that this requirement of judicial discretion would
be embraced only by those judges who prefer public policy choices to be
made by he judiciary rather than the legislature.' 4 ' Finally, Judge Wilkey
accused the majority of rewriting FOIA. He asserted that the majority, by
basing its interpretation of exemption 2 on its "own vision of appropriate
policy" and ignoring the en banc decision in Jordan, adopted an approach
which could only diminish public trust in the judiciary.'42
B. The Demise of a Narrow Interpretation of Exemption 2
The Crooker majority stated that its interpretation of exemption 2 was
"hardly surprising" based on the wording of exemption 2, its legislative
history and its treatment by the Supreme Court and the other circuits. The
Crooker interpretation can also be easily traced to the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's prior treatment of exemption 2. The construction given the
literal wording of the exemption appeared, with minor variations, in the
vacated Ginsburg panel decision as well as in the Vaughn 143 and Jordan'
44
concurring opinions. Ginsburg also proposed that the examples listed in
the Senate report were nonexclusive. Unlike the Crooker court which at-
tempted a total reconciliation between the reports, the Ginsburg court rec-
onciled the reports as to substantive matters. The predominant internality
standard, as the majority noted, was first seen in Judge Leventhal's concur-
140. Id at 1114.
141. Id. at 1114-15.
142. Id at 1121.
143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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ring opinion in Vaughn. 45 In addition, the circumvention of risk standard
previously appeared in Cox in the guise of a legitimate public interest test.
The court's adherence to the result in Jordan was based on Judge
Bazelon's "secret law" concurrence in Jordan,4 6 which Cox asserted had
been Jordan's primary focus. Finally, in considering the nondisclosure of
a BATF manual, the court adhered to the decisions in which the Second
14 7
and Ninth'48 Circuits had previously determined that disclosure would
risk circumvention of agency regulations and applied exemption 2.
Nevertheless, the extent to which Crooker manipulated the wording,
legislative history, and case law on exemption 2 is unique. While reaching
a result that is not without some merit, the majority's analysis of the word-
ing of exemption 2 failed to comment on the word "personnel" or explain
its presence in the language of the exemption. The interpretation adopted
by the majority reflects a policy judgment that circumvention of agency
regulations would be fostered by disclosure of certain law enforcement
materials. Although well-intentioned, this interpretation is not suggested
by the literal wording of the exemption.
The majority's assertion that the legislative history of exemption 2 pro-
vides a basis for withholding law enforcement materials is also weak. Be-
cause objection to a narrow reading of exemption 2 emanated primarily
from the House 4 9 and was never embodied in an amendment to the ex-
emption, the intent found by the majority reflects no more than the unful-
filled desires of FOIA's opponents to protect law enforcement materials. 15
0
Perhaps cognizant of the need to base congressional intent on the manifes-
tations of both houses,' 5 ' the court attempted to reconcile the Senate and
House reports concerning disclosure of sensitive law enforcement informa-
tion. 52 As the dissent noted, the majority's contention also runs counter to
the maxim of statutory interpretation that the expression of one thing im-
plies the exclusion of another.'5 3 It is unlikely that the Senate report in-
tended to include law enforcement materials within its listing of examples
145. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
150. Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1104 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
151. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A.31 (1st ed. Supp. 1970) ("The
basic principle is quite elementary: The content of the laws must depend upon the intent of
both Houses, not of just one.").
152. 670 F.2d at 1061.
153. Id at 1097 n.23 (citing C.D. SANDS, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.24 (4th ed. 1973)).
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which included "parking facilities. . . lunch hours. . . sick leave, and the
like." ' 54 Law enforcement materials are, after all, totally unlike the exam-
ples cited. Even more implausible is the majority's assertion that it re-
jected the legitimate public interest standard. 55 This standard was
embraced by Judge Leventhal in his Jordan concurrence, which the
Crooker majority specifically adopted in defining the literal wording of
exemption 2.156
The majority's treatment of the case law is further evidence of its result-
oriented approach. The court divided its analysis into two parts: cases
that relied on subsection (a)(2)(C) to exempt materials which, if disclosed,
would aid in the circumvention of the law, and those cases that relied on
exemption 2 to exempt these materials.' 57 While both subsections have
resulted in nondisclosure of law enforcement materials, the underlying ra-
tionales of the decisions are totally different. Moreover, each of the cir-
cuits that has relied on subsection (a)(2)(C) to exempt law enforcement
materials viewed exemption 2 as limited to minor employment-related
matters. 5 8 The Crooker court, how'ever, rejected the argument that sub-
section (a)(2)(C) provides an implicit exemption.' 59 At present, only two
circuits are philosophically aligned with Crooker-the Second and the
Ninth-both of which have utilized exemption 2 to deny disclosure of a
BATF manual.161 Unlike the state of the case law suggested by the major-
ity's treatment, the Crooker rationale has limited circuit-wide support
and may be derived more from an emotional response to disclosure of
material used by BATF than a principled determination of the scope of
exemption 2.
The majority also chose to disregard evidence that the Senate report
should be adopted. By glossing over Congress' clarification of FOIA ex-
emption 2 in the House Report on the Government in the Sunshine Act of
1976,161 the majority again appears to have chosen result over reason. As
154. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 2, at 36.
155. 670 F.2d at 1065-66.
156. Id at 1057 ("Exemption 2 is applicable where... disclosure would permit circum-
vention of the law, and there is no substantial, valid external interest ....") (quoting Jor-
dan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring)).
157. 670 F.2d at 1070-72.
158. See, e.g., Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1978); Stokes
v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
159. 670 F.2d at 1055 n.1l.
160. Hardy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 631 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1980);
Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978).
161. 670 F.2d at 1062 n.30. See supra note 48.
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one commentator has noted, it is an established principle that courts may
consult subsequent legislation as an aid in the clarification of earlier legis-
lation dealing with the same or similar subject.
162
Finally, the majority's new test fails to provide a workable standard for
courts. The predominant internality standard is ambiguous at best and, as
Judge Wilkey suggests, the two prongs of the test may well cancel each
other out.16 3 If the predominant internality standard proves unworkable,
then the potential for abuse is great. Judges will be tempted to glide over
the first prong of the test, and project their own biases into the second. It is
also questionable whether abuse will be prevented by the burden of prov-
ing "significant" risk.'64 If a court is predisposed to deny disclosure based
on a requester's status, the burden will be illusory.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that exemp-
tion 2 applies if the material meets a test of predominant internality and its
disclosure would significantly risk circumvention of agency regulations.
The new two-prong test for exemption 2 may prove to be more of an obsta-
cle to disclosure than was former section 3 of the APA. Crooker can be
most strongly criticized for its disregard of FOIA's true purpose, full
agency disclosure. By means of "cross currents" of concern, Crooker has
transformed a congressional commitment to disclosure into a delicate bal-
ance of the public's right to know, and the government's need for secrecy.
This balance can now be easily tipped in favor of nondisclosure.
Courts that have been attentive to the years of congressional struggle to
enact FOIA will reject the Crooker standard. Even a court that is sensitive
to the need for public access to government information may feel con-
strained to permit disclosure of material that risks circumvention of the
law. A determination of exemption 2 nondisclosure, nevertheless, should
be grounded in firm principles that do not erode the vitality of FOIA. The
suggestion that agencies and courts should turn to subsection (a)(2)(C) for
limited protection for law enforcement materials may prove to be a viable
solution. Although the material would still be available under subsection
(a)(3), which provides for disclosure of agency records upon request, the
162. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE SEVENTIES, § 3A.00-1 (Cumm. Supp.
1977). See, e.g., Erlenbough v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972); Alexander v.
Mayor & Commonality of Alexandria, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 1, 7 (1809); National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. ICC, 610 F.2d 865, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
163. 670 F.2d at 1115.
164. Id at 1074.
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protection afforded by subsection (a)(2)(C) would be sufficient in most
contexts. The danger in interpreting either subsection (a)(2)(C) or subsec-
tion (b)(2) as affording complete protection for law enforcement materials
far outweighs the danger inherent in releasing these materials. Denying
disclosure is in direct opposition to the purpose and language of FOIA,
whereas risking the occasional disclosure of sensitive law enforcement
materials is a limited price to pay for securing public access to government
information. Until Congress chooses to cut back on the FOIA's breadth,
courts should be wary of superimposing judicial discretion on expressions
of congressional policy.
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